Afghanistan and after : Central Asian states "on edge"

22 Janvier 2012 , Rédigé par ileridefense Publié dans #Russie-CEI

Former Soviet republics are bracing themselves for possible destabilisation as the date approaches for the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan.

In a vital contribution to a wide-ranging publication on the prospects for the ISAF withdrawal Afghanistan, Antonenko notes that ‘many of the lessons from the Soviet period, including that of the Soviet withdrawal, are relevant to the contemporary challenges faced by both the Afghans themselves and the ISAF.

In the current situation vis-à-vis Afghanistan, she sees the chief security concerns of Russia and the five former Soviet Central Asian republics ‘the threat of insurgency and terrorism, the political radicalisation of their people, and the spread of the drugs trafficking and organised crime.’

Of three republics -Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan - with populations spreading across the border into northern Afghanistan, Tajikistan has the deepest ties, she says. The main anti-government force in the 1992-97 Tajik civil war, which involved both Islamists and anti-Soviet democrats, operated from Afghanistan; and in September 2010 there was an increase in fatal clashes between Tajik government an insurgent forces, reportedly involving a link with al-Qaeda.

IMU

Uzbekistan is also directly exposed to the threat from insurgent groups that operate from Afghan territory, including notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). As an ally of the Taliban the IMU suffered heavily from the US-led invasion of Afghanistan but subsequently reconstituted itself. ‘Since 2008, perhaps in anticipation of ISAF’s departure, the IMU has consolidated its presence in northern Afghanistan in order to mount a fresh challenge to Uzbekistan’s president, Islam Karimov.’

A major concern for both the Central Asian states and Russia is the high volume of drug trafficking from Afghanistan. According to the United Nations, in 2008 Afghanistan produced an estimated 380 metric tonnes of heroin, virtually all for export, with 95 metric tonnes going through Central Asia, including 70 metric tonnes to Russia;.

Nevertheless, there are economic possibilities for the CIS states in Afghanistan, which, with proper roads, could help them develop the commercial relationships with China, India and south-East Asia. Their shortest route to the sea is via Afghanistan to Karachi

ISAF

NATO intervention may have helped the Central Asian states by drawing off the fire of the Taliban and groups like the IMU, by promising support for strategic projects; and giving financial support to Central Asian governments. Nevertheless, there are reservations about the ISAF presence, says the writer.

This is partly because of a perception that that the Western military presence has fuelled the emergency. The Central Asian governments are also aware that the NATO’s Northern Distribution Network could become an avenue for the export of instability into former Soviet Central Asia.

Uzbekistan was the first country to offer the Bush administration the use of its military facilities, but Kyrgyzstan followed soon after with its offer, in December 2011, of the Manas base. Manas became the ISAF transit hub. Russia offered full support in the early stages of the anti-Taliban operation. And although this cooled when Moscow suspected Washington of seeking to establish a permanent foothold in Central Asia, the 2010 ‘re-set’ again put co-operation over Afghanistan at the centre of US-Russia relations.

At a price

Russia and the Central Asian support has come at price for ISAF, says Antonenko. The US has been obliged to re-establish links with authoritarian governments, and to pay more for the use of military facilities in Central Asia.

In 2010 the new Kyrgyz government pushed to renegotiate supply contracts for the Manas base; and Uzbek government, which had been shunned by the West for the killing of hundreds of unarmed protesters at Andijan in 2005, insisted on full engagement in return for the continued use of its military facilities.

‘It even managed to secure an invitation for President Karimov to NATO’s 2008 summit in Romania, as a reward for agreeing to open the northern supply route running through the Termez-Haziratan border crossing and the Friendship Bridge’ by which Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in 1979 ad left ten years later.

Co-operation and rivalry

Although there is a high degree of congruence among Russia and the five Central Asian states (and China) with regard to Afghanistan, co-operation among them has been hindered by rivalries, particularly between resource-rich Kazakhstan and populous Ubekistan, both aspiring to regional leadership. In addition there is tension between Uzbekistan on one hand and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the other, over water management.

And while Russia wishes to address all questions surrounding military bases in Central Asia through the forum of NATO’s dialogue with the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Central Asian states insist on dealing bilaterally with the US or other USAF collaborators.

At the same time, China is providing stiff competition for Russia by investing heavily in the energy sectors of Central Asian countries. Another hindrance is continuing suspicion between Russia and the US, says Antonenko. ‘Although both have military bases in Central Asia, there is little interaction between their personnel’ (even in Kyrgyzstan, where the two bases are located just kilometers from each other.)

Sombre

The entry ends on a sombre note. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and possibly Tajikistan may be in the throes of transitions. Stability in Kyrgyzstan is also far from assured. There is a chance that IMU elements may increase attacks within Central Asia, exploiting internal tensions and rising Islamist sentiments.

Central Asian leaders are therefore likely to look for guarantees of regime security in exchange for their support of a US-led settlement in Afghanistan after ISAF’s withdrawal.

At the same time, says Antonenko, Russia and China will be seeking guarantees that the US does not establish a long-term military presence in Central Asia as a condition of their possible contribution to a long-term stabilisation programme.